United Nations S/2000/736

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2000
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 25 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 24 July 2000 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning Turkish troop concentrations along Iraq's international boundaries that can only be interpreted as being in preparation for the entry of the forces in question into the territory of Iraq. The Minister requests you to do your utmost to urge the Turkish Government to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from its acts of aggression and to withdraw its armed forces from Iraq's territory forthwith.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Saeed H. **Hasan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-55249 (E) 260700 260700

Annex to the identical letters dated 25 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Further to the letter dated 10 April 2000 addressed to you by the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq (S/2000/306, annex), I should like to call your attention to the presence of Turkish troop concentrations of one special forces brigade in strength along Iraq's international boundaries in Turkey's Şemdinli area opposite Iraq's Kani Rash sector in the Iraq-Iran-Turkey triangle. The massing of such forces can only be in preparation for their entry under various pretexts into Iraq's territory in the Sid Kan-Hajj Umran area.

Turkey has, moreover, reinforced its forces already positioned inside Iraqi territory with a view to expanding their theatre of operations through coordinated action with Jalal al-Talabani's group.

The questionable operations and manoeuvres of the Turkish forces constitute a new increment in the series of recurrent attacks being launched by the Turkish forces against the territory of Iraq, just as they coincide with the hostile military actions being perpetrated against the country on a daily basis by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

In condemning the renewed Turkish aggression against Iraqi territory in the strongest terms, the Government of Iraq affirms its right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to ensure that Turkey bears full international responsibility for the consequences of its recurring acts of aggression and provocation, its violations of Iraq's sovereignty and unity and its exposure of Iraq's security and territorial integrity to the gravest risks.

As I express the hope that the United Nations will fulfil its responsibilities as stipulated in the Charter and will halt the constant intimidation and aggression to which my country is being subjected, I ask you to do your utmost to urge the Turkish Government to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the norms of international law and the principles of good-neighbourliness by desisting from such acts of aggression and provocation and withdrawing its armed forces from Iraq's territory forthwith.

(*Signed*) Mohammed Said **Al-Sahaf**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

United Nations S/2000/737

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2000

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to bring to your attention the case of Miroljub Momcilovic, 60, and his sons Jugoslav, 32, and Boban, 25. These three Serbs from Gnjilane, Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, have been detained at Camp Bondsteel, the military base of the United States contingent of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), since 10 July 1999, charged with the murder of ethnic Albanian Afrim Gagica.

On 24 July 2000, the so-called international judge Patrice de Charette read the statement of Robert Black, an American corporal with KFOR, before the court at Gnjilane, in which he said that he had fired in self-defence into the shed in which, according to officials of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Gagica was killed. Corporal Black's statement in concession of the murder is part of the official report of the United States contingent of KFOR on the event and was accepted by the court at Gnjilane as evidence on the day of its reading. Instead of setting Mr. Momcilovic and his sons free after the main hearing on 24 July, Judge de Charette adjourned the session, asking the United States Army's investigation department to provide "new evidence", and extended the detention of the Serbs.

It took the United States contingent more than a year to provide evidence in this case. The concealment of truth is mystifying and accounted for the imprisonment of three innocent Serbs for more than a year. Grist to the mill of the campaign of terror and vilification of ethnic Albanian extremist terrorists against the Serbs, it also served to destroy the few remaining vestiges of confidence of Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kouchner's justice.

The incident is illustrative of the practice of arbitrary arrest of the Serbs of Kosovo and Metohija who are detained without firm evidence, on trumped-up charges and most often following false reports of ethnic Albanians, as well as of unwarranted postponements of their trials. At the same time, it brings into focus the fact that no Albanian has been arrested, let alone tried, for terrorist acts in which more than a thousand persons have been killed and another thousand kidnapped. Bearing that in mind one is bound to conclude that, by the failure to act and by their patronizing attitude towards ethnic Albanian terrorists, KFOR and UNMIK are directly responsible for the difficult situation in Kosovo and Metohija and its consequences.

00-55241 (E) 260700

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vladislav **Jovanovic**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2000/738

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2000

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

(for the period 27 January-26 July 2000)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In paragraph 18 of that resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report within three months of the date of adoption of that resolution and every six months thereafter. The current report covers the activities of UNTAET and developments in East Timor since the submission of the last report on 26 January 2000. During this period, the Council received five public briefings, which are contained in the Council's records (S/PV.4097, S/PV.4114, S/PV.4133, S/PV.4147 and S/PV.4165). Matters covered in those briefings will not be repeated here, except in summary form. Seventeen regulations issued by UNTAET during this period will be issued as an addendum to this report.

II. Political transition

2. The 15-member National Consultative Council (NCC), which was established in December 1999, played a crucial role as the primary mechanism through which the East Timorese participated in UNTAET's decision-making. However, it became clear over time that its membership needed to be expanded to facilitate broader participation in policy-making. After intensive consultation, the National Council (NC) was created on 14 July to replace NCC. It will have 33 members, all Timorese, appointed by the Transitional Administrator as follows: one from each of the 13 districts, 7 from political parties within the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), three from other parties, and one each representing youth, students, non-governmental organizations, the professions, farmers, labour, business, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church and the Muslim community. Consultations are under way regarding the selection of the Council's members.

3. At the same time, UNTAET reorganized itself to resemble more closely the future government and to increase the direct participation of the Timorese, who thus assume a greater share of the political responsibility. Eight portfolios were created: internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs, social affairs, finance, justice, police and emergency services, and political affairs. The first four have been entrusted to East Timorese, the other four to senior UNTAET staff members. They were sworn in on 15 and 17 July. The eight officials form a Cabinet chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It is responsible for formulating policies and recommending regulations and directives for consideration by the National Council. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General retains full responsibility as Transitional Administrator in accordance with Security Council resolution 1272 (1999).

4. When UNTAET was established, there was no history of open and democratic political activity in East Timor. Since then, CNRT and its component parties have been active, and new political organizations have

00-55073 (E) 260700

emerged. The Socialist Party of East Timor, the Labour Party, the Popular Defence Council of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (CPD-RDTL) and the United Christian Democracy Party have set up branch offices and organized demonstrations and other political events. The East Timor National Liberation Front (FRETILIN), the largest component of CNRT, organized a series of regional conferences, culminating in a national conference in Dili last May.

5. Regrettably, there have been disturbing cases of intimidation against groups and parties not under the CNRT umbrella. CPD-RDTL, a group that split from FRETILIN, has encountered sometimes violent CNRT opposition, especially in the Suai area. In June, unknown assailants vandalized the Dili office of the Student Solidarity Council, one of the strongest pro-independence groups in East Timor prior to the popular consultation. In March, death threats were directed against staff of the Catholic Radio Timor Kmanek to prevent their announcers' speaking about politics on the radio. Ethnic and religious minorities have also been the targets of harassment and intimidation. On 8 June, the Protestant churches in Ermera and Aileu were burned. There were also several attacks on the mosque in Dili, and ethnic Chinese were threatened and harassed.

6. In order to counter these tendencies and prepare the population for democratic elections, UNTAET has launched a programme entitled "The future of democracy in East Timor" which targets a broad cross-section of East Timorese society. The programme aims to promote civic education, constitutional development, the rule of law and political education. UNTAET has also disseminated information on human rights through its police and non-governmental organizations and is working with local community leaders to develop a culture of tolerance.

7. Apart from these special efforts, UNTAET has promoted the free flow of information and ideas by supporting local media (two newspapers and two news magazines) and through its own operations (radio, limited television broadcasts, fortnightly newsletter), as well as through providing training for East Timorese.

III. Relations with Indonesia

8. The normalization of relations between Indonesia and East Timor has progressed well. President Wahid visited Dili on 29 February, where he was warmly welcomed. On this occasion, agreements were signed, concerning the promotion of trade and communication, the establishment of representative offices, and continued access by East Timorese to academic institutions in Indonesia. Agreement was also reached on the establishment of a border regime to facilitate access for people and goods between the Oecussi enclave and the rest of East Timor as well as cross-border trade.

9. Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, has twice visited Jakarta since then and Mr. Xanana Gusmão, President of CNRT, visited Jakarta on 28 April, where he met with President Wahid and senior government officials to further strengthen bilateral relations.

10. On 6 April, Indonesia and UNTAET concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in legal, judicial and human rights matters. In accordance with the memorandum, UNTAET has assisted the Indonesian authorities in their efforts to identify and prosecute those responsible for human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. To this end, UNTAET has located and interviewed witnesses and provided the results to Indonesian investigators.

11. On 5 July, agreement was reached on the establishment of a Joint Border Committee, which is responsible for managing all cross-border matters. Key outstanding issues are an arrangement for transit between the Oecussi enclave and the rest of East Timor, which is critical for the future well-being of Oecussi, and the payment of pensions to former employees who wish to reside in East Timor. The early resolution of this question would encourage many refugees to return home.

12. UNTAET has established offices in Jakarta and Kupang, and Indonesia has a mission in East Timor. The office in Kupang helped coordinate UNTAET's assistance to flood victims on both sides of the border between East and West Timor in May. It has been closely involved with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in initiatives designed to encourage reconciliation and the return of the refugees who remain in West Timor and Java.

IV. Refugees

13. More than 167,000 refugees have returned from Indonesia, primarily from West Timor. The repatriation effort is coordinated by UNHCR; the International Organization for Migration (IOM) arranges their movement to their destinations. This activity has proceeded with few incidents and the reintegration of the refugees into their original communities has been generally smooth.

14. UNTAET supported the work of UNHCR at the political level by promoting reconciliation and preparing the communities in East Timor for the return of those of the refugees who had opposed independence. This was done in discussions involving local organizations and, often, the church. UNTAET also arranged visits to East Timor by some militia leaders so that they would know what to expect when they and their followers returned.

15. The Governor of West Timor, Mr. Piet Tallo, visited East Timor on 8 June and met Mr. Vieira de Mello and Mr. Xanana Gusmão as well as other East Timorese leaders. Subsequently, on 9 and 10 June, the Bishop of Baucau, Mr. Basilio Nascimento, visited West Timor.

16. Despite these efforts, an estimated 85,000 to 120,000 refugees remain in camps in West Timor, where militias opposed to independence continue to exercise great influence and impede the work of UNHCR by intimidation and violence. As a result, an important effort by UNHCR to register refugees and determine whether they wished to return or be resettled was repeatedly delayed and had to be postponed indefinitely earlier this month, when militia members attacked UNHCR's workers.

17. UNHCR has increased its efforts to persuade the Indonesian authorities to assume their obligations and act on commitments made. These include free and unhindered access to the refugees, ensuring the safety of humanitarian workers and the separation of former military personnel, police and civil servants from the refugees. If these obligations are not met, UNHCR may be compelled to withdraw from some or all camps.

V. Governance and public administration

Civil service

18. UNTAET has continued to build the foundations of governance, including a legal framework, a central financial capacity and a civil service structure. This has been done with a view to transferring administrative functions to a sustainable East Timorese administration. The recruitment of Timorese civil servants is conducted through an open process based on competition and merit, under the supervision of the Public Service Commission.

19. There are now 5,275 civil service employees in the East Timor administration, including teachers and health workers on temporary contracts. Permanent hiring began in July and the Civil Service Academy was inaugurated on 8 May. In cooperation with UNTAET, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is preparing a comprehensive project, amounting to approximately US$ 30 million, for capacity-building in governance and public administration. In the second half of the year, UNDP, in conjunction with Portugal's National Institute of Public Administration, will provide courses for political leaders in globalization, constitutional issues, project development and implementation, and ethics for 210 persons. UNTAET is working with CNRT and donors to establish a diplomatic training course; the first round of training for 50 students will begin on 31 July.

Public finance

20. During the reporting period, UNTAET established the Central Fiscal Authority and the Central Payments Office. Recruitment of Timorese staff has begun and will be followed by specialized training, assisted by the Asian Development Bank. The Treasury has been established within the Central Fiscal Authority. It is responsible for the execution of the budget, including expenditure, control and monitoring. The Revenue Service has been established and a tax system instituted, which includes a service tax on restaurants, hotels, telecommunications and transport rentals.

21. The consolidated budget for 2000/01, and projections for the next two years were presented to

donors in Lisbon in June and were favourably received. The budget provides for recurrent spending of US$ 43.63 million and capital spending of US$ 15.6 million. Financing this budget will require additional contributions to the UNTAET Trust Fund of US$ 16 million. Contributions to the Trust Fund stand at about US$ 28.5 million.

22. Public spending under the UNTAET Trust Fund was limited in the first months of the mission because of normal delays as programmes were being planned, with expenses being met by other agencies as part of relief programmes, and difficulties in the procurement of certain goods and services, as well as limitations of port and warehouse capacity. These obstacles have essentially been overcome. Disbursements from the UNTAET Trust Fund so far total over US$ 3 million on civil service salaries, quick-impact projects and expenditures for light capital equipment and miscellaneous services. A further US$ 7.9 million has been committed for furniture and equipment for the health, education and social affairs departments.

23. A source of revenue for East Timor is the exploitation of petroleum in the "Timor Gap" region of the Timor Sea. In early February, to ensure the continued and smooth commercial development of the Timor Gap, UNTAET signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Australia in which UNTAET, on behalf of East Timor, agreed to continue the terms of the Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia (Timor Gap Treaty). This was without prejudice to position of the future government of an independent East Timor. In consultation with the East Timorese leaders, UNTAET has been in touch with the Government of Australia, with a view to working out a new legal regime that would come into force at independence.

Economy

24. The collapse of both the public and private sectors following last year's violence, in conjunction with large-scale destruction, had a devastating effect on the economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have shrunk in 1999 by as much as 38 per cent. Unemployment soared, especially in the urban areas. The prices of fuel and other basic goods rose steeply, in part reflecting the removal of subsidies. UNTAET is trying to normalize border trade with West Timor in order to improve the supply of basic goods.

25. To provide immediate relief and also to launch the repair of the infrastructure, quick-impact projects have been carried out throughout the country. Thirty thousand persons have been employed under projects overseen by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), injecting US$ 3.5 million into the local economy. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) have funded US$ 1.3 million in reconstruction projects (mainly road rehabilitation) which have also provided temporary employment. The UNTAET Trust Fund and United Nations agencies have committed over US$ 1 million, providing employment to 5,350 persons. These programmes are coming to an end, and it will fall more and more to the private sector to create employment opportunities.

26. Business activity has expanded on a moderate scale. By the end of June, 2,696 private businesses had been registered, with over 70 per cent coming from the business community. The World Bank-administered Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) has established the Small Loans Enterprise Programme to assist in the rapid rehabilitation of small businesses. Up to US$ 10 million will be lent over two years; the first tranche amounting to US$ 4 million is currently being disbursed. UNTAET has established an Investment Promotion Unit to assist foreign investors.

27. Some 80 per cent of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihood. This sector saw a fairly strong recovery in the first half of this year, owing to a good coffee crop and strong domestic demand. Public investment is foreseen to promote recovery and reduce poverty in rural areas and to support medium-term initiatives to create a sustainable base for future increases in productivity. A regulation was promulgated in May prohibiting the logging and export of wood from East Timor in order to halt the damage already caused by unregulated logging. The design of projects began in July to ensure the protection and preservation of existing water supplies through community-based watershed management and reforestation programmes.

28. East Timor has inherited a complex and often contradictory system of land ownership. This has caused uncertainty and many disputes. UNTAET is

making preparations for a Land and Property Commission to restore and maintain the land registry; resolve disputes through mediation, arbitration and, where necessary, adjudication; and allocate abandoned public and private property. UNTAET officials are currently involved as mediators in the resolution of two complex land disputes in Viqueque and Baucau.

Infrastructure

29. Prolonged rains and heavy traffic by the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and UNTAET have exacerbated the already poor condition of the road network. Several main arteries closed during April and May owing to land slips and the collapse of bridges. In February, a mission coordinated by the Asian Development Bank agreed on a remedial strategy for emergency rehabilitation, restoring normal government services for routine, emergency and periodic maintenance, and implementing a capital programme of pavement rehabilitation and strengthening. The full contracts were mobilized in early June.

30. Dili's port is a critical bottleneck, and rehabilitation work is under way to increase its capacity at a cost of approximately US$ 7 million. Japan will provide navigational equipment worth US$ 2.6 million. The airports in Dili and Baucau have suffered damage owing to inadequate maintenance, destruction, theft of equipment and heavy use over recent months. Emergency runway repairs are under way in Dili.

31. Intensive efforts were undertaken to restore electricity to Dili and the surrounding villages with support from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. However, more needs to be done, and power cuts remain frequent. UNDP will rehabilitate 13 of the remaining rural stations with funding from Japan, which will also finance the maintenance of a power plant in Dili. Portugal is financing the rehabilitation of four regional stations. A project led by the Asian Development Bank will support technical assistance for the setting of tariffs, metering, billing accounts, and financial management systems.

32. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, in conjunction with district administrations, have provided the core of assistance in the water and sanitation sector, including equipment, materials and personnel to effect emergency repairs. No major outbreaks of disease or serious water shortages have been reported. By May, water supplies in all 13 of East Timor's main district towns had been partially restored.

33. Telecommunications remain seriously deficient. Limited mobile phone coverage in Dili and parts of Baucau and Suai, and landlines in Dili are provided by a private company on a temporary basis. The East Timorese postal service commenced operations at the end of April and provides service internationally via Darwin and internally between Dili and Baucau.

34. On 21 February, the World Bank and UNTAET signed a grant agreement for a community empowerment project, which links support for rehabilitation and income-generating activities with the strengthening of the capacity of subdistricts and villages, through elected representatives, to determine their priorities and manage the projects they select. The project has three major components — grants to communities through local community councils, a cultural heritage project and a civil society development fund. Over 340 councils have been formed and more than 70 facilitators have been trained and fielded through nine districts. The project totals US$ 21.5 million over two and a half years.

Education

35. The vast majority of primary school children and teachers were back in school by the end of April. Some 200,000 students will participate in the coming school year. Four thousand seven hundred and forty schoolteachers are being recruited into the civil service based on examinations held for this purpose in May. The conditions they face, however, remain very difficult. Supplies are insufficient and, pending their recruitment, most teachers have been surviving on a stipend initially supplemented by an allocation of rice provided since December 1999 by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

36. Many schools are structurally unsound and need to be demolished. A US$ 13.9 million project has been agreed between UNTAET and the World Bank for a rehabilitation programme. The first stage is to repair 2,100 primary and secondary school classrooms, supply furniture, books and other instructional

materials. Secondly, new schools will be built to replace some of those to be demolished. Thirdly, a policy development component will be established to provide analysis and options for the future national education system. There will also be a project on quality of instruction, through teacher training and the strengthening of local school councils. UNTAET, UNICEF and CNRT are providing short preparation courses for teachers in the run-up to the next school year, while Portugal is providing more comprehensive teacher training initiatives to 750 teachers, the number being expected to have risen to 2,500 in the next year.

37. Japan, the Ford Foundation and Caritas Norway have undertaken to support the return of East Timorese students to Indonesian universities to complete their studies. A list of 989 has been sent to the Department of Education in Indonesia, which will forward it to all relevant institutions. The scholarships will also cover 500 East Timorese students who are already continuing their studies in Indonesia. Indonesia has provided assurances that it will complete the scholarships of 162 final-year East Timorese students. Applicants are currently being interviewed for teaching positions at the national university of East Timor, which is scheduled to reopen in October.

Health

38. Owing to the collapse of the public health-care system, non-governmental organizations, funded by a number of donors and coordinated by UNTAET, have become the main health service providers. In each district, a lead organization has been designated to implement national policy and programmes. A national tuberculosis campaign has been undertaken in 9 of 13 districts treating more than 1,500 patients. A malaria prevention campaign has also been launched.

39. The post-ballot violence damaged 77 per cent of the clinics. Since January, 80 health facilities have been opened and a number of mobile clinics are operating. However, there are only 23 Timorese medical doctors in the country. It will therefore be some time before there can be a full Timorese health service. There is not such a shortage of nursing staff, although many will require more training.

40. A multi-donor mission in April defined a short-term strategy of transition from the emergency phase to a more systematic approach to health delivery. The mission developed an integrated sector-wide programme funded through the trust fund administered by the World Bank, the UNTAET Trust Fund and bilateral initiatives. In June, UNTAET and the World Bank signed a US$ 12.7 million Health Sector Rehabilitation and Development Programme which seeks to address immediate health needs while developing an appropriate long-term health system. United Nations organizations, in particular the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), will provide technical and other inputs to the health sector programme. The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) will continue to provide support.

Law and order

41. The situation in East Timor has remained stable overall. However, there was a notable increase in low-level personal and property crime. This can be largely attributed to the rapid increase in the cost of living, unemployment and rapid, unplanned urbanization. Reported assaults rose from 49 in January to 86 in June, and thefts from 25 to 45. There were sporadic incidents of unrest in Dili, the most serious of which took place on 30 April when a fight between youth groups at a sports stadium moved to the nearby central market and continued for several hours, resulting in 4 injured and 18 arrests. Following this incident, the police were authorized to carry side arms.

42. The Dili courthouse held its first hearings in May, and the Baucau court opened in late June, to be followed by courts in Oecussi and Suai. Judges have been appointed to all four. Temporary arrangements, including travelling judges and prosecutors, will be used to clear the backlog of some 60 cases in the other districts. Six hundred cases are still pending from before the popular consultation; efforts are under way to retrieve the records, but many have been destroyed. A total of 16 East Timorese judges, 8 prosecutors and 8 public defenders have been appointed. Ten more judges and four prosecutors were recruited at the end of June. All are undergoing continuous training. Four international judges have also been appointed. Two will sit on a panel to hear cases for serious criminal matters and two on the East Timor Court of Appeal. These judges and prosecutors will also act as mentors for their Timorese colleagues.

43. Two detention facilities have been opened, in the Dili and Ermera districts. Two more are in the planning stage for Baucau and Manatuto. The facilities are managed by a small group of international personnel funded by a donor contribution, with some assistance from the civilian police. Fifty-eight Timorese have been recruited as prison wardens and are being trained by the international personnel.

44. **Police**: since January, UNTAET's civilian police grew from 400 to 1,270 officers from the following countries: Argentina (5), Australia (80), Austria (10), Bangladesh (35), Bosnia and Herzegovina (12), Brazil (13), Canada (14), Cape Verde (2), China (15), Egypt (10), the Gambia (26), Ghana (91), Jordan (219), Kenya (14), Mozambique (3), Namibia (9), Nepal (47), New Zealand (12), the Niger (21), Nigeria (51), Norway (1), Pakistan (1), Philippines (105), Portugal (165), the Russian Federation (3), Samoa (25), Senegal (16), Singapore (40), Slovenia (2), Spain (19), Sri Lanka (30), Thailand (29), Turkey (18), the United Kingdom (14), Ukraine (8), the United States of America (80), Zambia (5) and Zimbabwe (20). Included in the above are two Rapid Response Units of 120 each from Jordan and Portugal.

45. The first group of cadets of the new Timor Lorosa'e Police Service (TLPS) graduated from the Police Training College on 11 July. The second class began on 17 July. The current capacity of the college is 50 cadet recruits per 12-week training period. The building of police capacity is thus very slow. Accelerating it would require funding beyond the current East Timor budget. The Timor Lorosa'e Police Unit has been established at UNTAET's civilian police headquarters to facilitate the induction of the Timorese into the positions currently held by international personnel.

46. UNTAET follows a community-based approach to policing, participating in local problem-solving meetings and other community activities. Traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution are commonly used.

47. UNTAET continues to receive reports of human rights violations committed in the context of the popular consultation. An investigation unit has been established in the Human Rights Unit to look into these cases. In this context, there have been approximately 345 exhumations across East Timor since 25 October 1999. Some 40 other grave sites have been identified and marked awaiting exhumation.

48. **Border control**: UNTAET's Border Control Unit maintains operations at Dili's port and airport and at the two crossing points on the border with West Timor. The unit's main functions are the control and monitoring of customs, immigration and quarantine, and the establishment, training and development of the Border Service of East Timor. UNTAET has tightened customs and immigration controls at ports of entry and has collected US$ 2.4 million in revenues. More than 2,000 temporary travel documents have been issued to East Timorese travellers.

49. The Border Control Unit has received support from Australia, Finland, Portugal, New Zealand and the United States, which have made available customs and immigration personnel. The Border Service of East Timor now includes 37 international officers and 147 East Timorese officers. To date, 90 Timorese border service officers have completed a basic training course; all receive in-service training.

Civilian staffing

50. As of 21 July, UNTAET had 2,684 civilian staff, of whom 1,886 were recruited locally and 798 internationally. UNTAET continues to lack experts and experienced administrators. The shortage of experts is mainly in the fields of land and property, customs, statistics, trade and commerce, agriculture, judicial affairs and infrastructure. A significant obstacle for the mission has been the lack of qualified interpreters and translators.

VI. Security

51. A phased transfer of responsibility from the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) to UNTAET's military component took place during the month of February. Since then UNTAET's force has conducted security operations throughout the country and has supported the activities of other components, notably the police, helped with the delivery of relief goods in remote areas, and provided medical care to civilians.

52. The security situation has been generally stable. However, there was a period from late February to mid-March during which UNTAET's military positions near the border came under fire and four significant cross-border incursions were carried out by militia

groups operating from West Timor. Following these attacks, UNTAET's Force Commander and the Director of Political Affairs travelled to Jakarta where they met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the Armed Forces. As a result of these meetings, the Indonesian armed forces undertook to renew efforts to ensure security along the border and prevent militia infiltration into East Timor. On 11 April, UNTAET's Force Commander and the commander of the Indonesian forces in West Timor signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding tactical coordination in the border area to enhance the cooperation. The Indonesian armed forces positioned a second battalion and a brigade headquarters on the border.

53. Thereafter, the situation along the border was quieter. However, there was a grenade attack against an UNTAET post on 28 May, in which an Australian soldier was injured, and another attack on 21 June. On 24 July, an UNTAET patrol, investigating a reported cross-border incursion in the Cova Lima district, was attacked with automatic fire. A New Zealand soldier was killed in the incident. The incident is the subject of an ongoing investigation. There have also been isolated incidents of shots being fired along the border, particularly in the north.

54. Since October 1999, the troops of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) have been cantoned in the Aileu district. Difficult living conditions, lack of supplies and lack of clarity about their current and future role have recently led to concerns over discipline and morale. FALINTIL has sent a number of its personnel home on leave, reducing the number in the cantonment area from over 1,000 in October to less than 500 at present. UNTAET has allocated US$ 100,000 from the Consolidated Budget of East Timor to provide food for two months to the FALINTIL personnel and their dependants.

55. The current strength of UNTAET's military component is 8,032 all ranks, including 198 military observers, from the following countries: Australia (1,542), Bangladesh (572), Bolivia (2), Brazil (81), Canada (3), Chile (33), Denmark (2), Egypt (83), Fiji (188), France (6), Ireland (44), Jordan (720), Kenya (252), Malaysia (32), Mozambique (12), Nepal (168), New Zealand (675), Norway (6), the Republic of Korea (444), Pakistan (804), Peru (23), the Philippines (623), Portugal (759), the Russian Federation (2), Singapore (24), Sweden (2), Thailand (919), Turkey (2), Uruguay (1), the United Kingdom (4) and the United States (4). On 21 July, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit (Thailand) replaced Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos (Philippines) as Force Commander.

56. When planning for UNTAET's military component last year, the aim was to create a sufficiently robust force so as not to invite challenges after it took over from INTERFET. It was envisaged that the strength of the force could be reduced if the situation remained stable. This has turned out to be the case, especially in the eastern sector. Given also the improved capacity of the police, it is intended to effect a reduction in that sector from currently 1,850 to a battalion-size force of 500 by the end of January 2001.

57. The military observers provided a United Nations presence in the districts before the military and civilian components were fully deployed. Their strength will now be reduced to 150, and a further reduction is being considered. They continue to carry out important liaison functions, especially with the Indonesian armed forces and FALINTIL.

58. It was not originally envisaged that East Timor would have armed forces, except for security personnel associated with the police. Initially, CNRT supported this view, bearing in mind the country's limited resources. CNRT has changed its position and now advocates the establishment of a national security force, initially based on members of FALINTIL. East Timor will, of course, be free to decide this matter after independence. However, CNRT leaders regard the establishment of such a force as a necessary element in the transition to independence so that East Timor is able to guard its borders when UNTAET leaves. With financial support from the United Kingdom, a team organized by King's College, London, is currently undertaking a study of East Timor's future defence and security needs and their practical and financial implications. The study is to be completed in August, following which there will be a broad discussion of its recommendations.

VII. Humanitarian affairs

59. UNTAET's Humanitarian and Emergency Rehabilitation component plays the central coordinating role for humanitarian activities, providing leadership and close liaison with all actors. Regular meetings at central and district levels and weekly

sectoral groups (some of which are coordinated by the Governance and Public Administration component) continued to bring together humanitarian agencies to ensure country-wide coverage. A coordination centre has been set up to support non-governmental organizations and, in particular, to develop the capacity of local development organizations. This centre has recently been handed over to East Timorese management with ongoing support from UNTAET.

60. WFP has coordinated logistical support for the humanitarian effort since October 1999, with support first from INTERFET, then from UNTAET's military component and other United Nations agencies. Logistics for country-wide food distributions have been efficiently managed with more than 35,000 metric tons distributed since September 1999 by WFP, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. The general food distributions, which averted a large-scale emergency, have been replaced by targeted distributions to vulnerable groups and schools and incentives for work.

61. The supply of "phase 2" (semi-permanent) shelter materials was hindered by delays in delivery from external sources, the prolonged rainy season and widespread deterioration of the road network. Many subdistricts were cut off from central stores. Distribution of shelter material has now accelerated: 13,500 house kits (out of the planned 35,000) have been distributed by UNHCR and its implementing partners. A further 10,000 kits have been distributed by other humanitarian actors. Continuation of the shelter programme remains a top priority, and the delivery of shelter material has been extended by six months to the end of 2000. Timber has been imported to reduce the negative impact of rebuilding on the East Timor environment.

62. Conditions in East Timor have somewhat improved, and the immediate emergency is considered over. The focus has now shifted to reconstruction and rehabilitation. A country-wide review of the humanitarian operation resulted in the overall conclusion that humanitarian assistance had been delivered in a timely and effective manner. One lesson learned concerned the need to improve consultation with the beneficiaries and local civil leaders in such operations. The review also served as a preliminary account to donors for all funds spent in the period October 1999-April 2000. Of the US$ 150 million received, 79 per cent had been spent, of which 59 per cent was for food assistance, repatriation of refugees and shelter support. Funds were spent evenly across the 13 districts of East Timor, except for Dili district, which received more.

VIII. Observations

63. When I reported to the Security Council last January, UNTAET was a fledgling operation, still building its own capacity while trying to advance as fast as possible on a broad range of issues. Today, although it has not yet reached its full designated capacity, UNTAET can look with satisfaction on what it has achieved so far. It has contributed to the alleviation of the emergency brought about by the violence and destruction that followed the popular consultation last year; it has maintained a secure environment; it has established the foundations of an effective administration; and, above all, it has established a relationship of mutual respect and trust with the East Timorese.

64. The last six months have also made clearer how daunting the task is that the United Nations has undertaken in East Timor. The Organization had never before attempted to build and manage a State. Nor did it have an opportunity to prepare for this assignment; the team in East Timor had to be assembled ad hoc and still lacks important expertise in a number of fields.

65. The relationship between UNTAET and the East Timorese is obviously crucial for the attainment of the mandate. While Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) gives the United Nations exclusive authority, my Special Representative has chosen to proceed only in the closest possible consultation with the East Timorese and with their full consent. The appointment of Timorese as heads of department is a further step towards the increased sharing of political responsibility.

66. UNTAET has maintained close contact with the different political groupings, notably with CNRT and its President, Mr. Xanana Gusmão, who is the most respected Timorese leader and commands great personal authority. However, signs of intolerance of other political groups that have surfaced in recent weeks are cause for concern. I trust that CNRT will defend the political freedom for which it has fought and will welcome and encourage the broader

participation in the political process that the creation of the National Council was intended to promote.

67. East Timor's best assurance of a secure future lies in healthy relations with the countries in the region, particularly Indonesia, its closest neighbour. Great progress has been made in this regard, owing in no small measure to the personal efforts of President Wahid and Mr. Gusmão. However, the unresolved issue of the East Timorese refugees in West Timor, the activities of pro-integration militias, who exercise control over the refugees, and continuing cross-border attacks by groups based in West Timor are very disturbing, as highlighted by the fatal shooting of a United Nations soldier. I expect that effective steps will be taken by the Indonesian authorities to bring the situation fully under control.

68. When I visited East Timor last February, I asked my Special Representative to establish benchmarks to guide the activities of the mission towards achieving minimum goals in East Timor that would provide the East Timorese with a sound platform for governing their country when independence was achieved. The key areas are: to ensure security during the transitional period and arrangements for East Timor's security once it is independent; to establish a credible system of justice in which fundamental human rights are respected; to achieve a reasonable level of reconstruction of public services and infrastructure; to establish an administration that is financially sustainable; and to manage a political transition to independence, culminating in the adoption of a constitution and democratic elections.

69. The last objective is, no doubt, the most important, since it entails the establishment of a political system that is responsive to the citizens and a political leadership that is responsible in its decisions. The East Timorese are increasingly impatient to take responsibility for their affairs and do not wish the transition period to continue for too long. Indeed, many would hope to reach independence by the end of next year, in the full knowledge that East Timor, as one of the least developed countries, will require international support for some time to come.

70. Finally, I should like to express my deep appreciation to the Member States that have supported this difficult mission by contributing personnel, equipment and financial support. I also wish to pay a warm tribute to Mr. Vieira de Mello and all the members of UNTAET and of the agencies and organizations that have been a part of this effort. They have done very well in difficult conditions, bringing great credit on themselves and on the United Nations.

United Nations S/2000/739

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2000

Original: English

Letter dated 26 July 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, concerning Sierra Leone. In paragraph 4 of that resolution, the Committee is required to report to the Council on notifications received from States on the export of arms and related *matériel* to Sierra Leone, as well as on notifications of imports of arms and related *matériel* made by the Government of Sierra Leone.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone received notification on 25 July 2000, from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for the export of the following arms and related *matériel* to the Government of Sierra Leone for use by the Sierra Leonean Army: 5 million rounds of 7.62-mm NATO LINK ammunition.

(*Signed*) Anwarul Karim **Chowdhury**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone

00-55443 (E) 260700

United Nations S/2000/740

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2000

Original: English

Letter dated 21 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to refer to the Security Council presidential statement read to the press on 19 July 2000 and broadcast by Radio France International concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which contains false information about the movements of the Rwandese Patriotic Army.

The Government of Rwanda would like to categorically state that there are no such movements by the Rwandese Patriotic Army and that the Army has fully respected the Lusaka Agreement.

On the contrary, such movements might be a prelude to more violations of the ceasefire by President Kabila's Government and its allies and latest reports by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) do tell you more.

The Government of Rwanda has repeatedly urged the Security Council to ensure expeditious deployment of the observers of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) so as to monitor implementation of the ceasefire, verify all violations and bring all those responsible to account. To date, MONUC's miniscule presence is largely symbolic. President Kabila has not only ridiculed MONUC, he has also rejected President Masire as the facilitator of the inter-Congolese political dialogue and remains intransigent towards all the other political actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It is high time the Security Council as a whole pronounced itself on these series of serious violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

The Government of Rwanda remains committed to the full implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and expects all the other signatories to do the same.

I would be very grateful if you could circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Joseph W. **Mutaboba**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-55437 (E) 260700

United Nations S/2000/741

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 July 2000

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon and also its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

R*ecalling also* the statements of its President of 20 April 2000 (S/PRST/2000/13), 23 May 2000 (S/PRST/2000/18) and 18 June (S/PRST/2000/21) on the situation in Lebanon, in particular its endorsement of the work done by the United Nations as mandated by the Security Council including the Secretary-General's conclusion that as of 16 June 2000 Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460),

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of 20 July 2000 (S/2000/718) and its observations and recommendations mentioned therein,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 11 July 2000 to the Secretary-General (S/2000/674),

1. *Endorses* the understanding, mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General of 20 July 2000, that the Force will deploy and function fully throughout its area of operations and that the Government of Lebanon will strengthen its presence in this area, by deploying additional troops and internal security forces;

2. *Decides*, in this context, to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of 6 months, until 31 January 2001;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. *Welcomes* the statement in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 24 July 2000 (S/2000/731) that, as of that date, the Government of Israel had removed all violations of the withdrawal line;

00-55537 (E) 270700

5. *Calls on* the parties to respect that line, to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with UNIFIL;

6. *Calls on* the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority and presence in the south, and in particular to proceed with a significant deployment of the Lebanese armed forces as soon as possible;

7. *Welcomes* the establishment of checkpoints by the Government of Lebanon in the vacated area, and *encourages* the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including through the control of all checkpoints;

8. *Welcomes* the measures taken by the Secretary-General and the troop contributing countries regarding UNIFIL military personnel and deployment, as agreed to in the above-mentioned statements of its President, and *reaffirms* that the expected redeployment of UNIFIL should be conducted in coordination with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese armed forces;

9. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of UNIFIL as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978);

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon;

11. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

12. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General to submit to the Council by 31 October 2000 a report on progress towards achieving the objectives of resolution 425 (1978) and towards completion by UNIFIL of the tasks originally assigned to it, and *requests* the Secretary-General to include in this report recommendations on the tasks that could be carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

13. *Decides* to review the situation, by early November 2000, and to consider any steps it deems appropriate regarding UNIFIL, on the basis of this report, the extent of the deployment of UNIFIL and the actions taken by the Government of Lebanon to restore its effective authority and presence in the area, in particular through a significant deployment of the Lebanese armed forces;

14. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

United Nations S/2000/742

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 July 2000
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 25 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the text of a communiqué issued on 25 July 2000 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning the unfriendly remarks about the Russian Federation made by the Georgian Deputy Minister of State, Mr. T. Isakadze, in his statement at a meeting of one of the working bodies of the Economic and Social Council (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) G. **Gatilov**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

00-55555 (E) 270700 270700

Annex to the letter dated 25 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

At a recent meeting in New York of one of the working bodies of the Economic and Social Council, the head of the Georgian delegation, the Deputy Minister of State, Mr. T. Isakadze, made unfriendly remarks about the Russian Federation to the effect that the Russian Federation was involved in the outbreak of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and that the Russian peacekeepers deployed in the zone separating the sides, in words of the Georgian representative, are not carrying out their mission in an effective manner.

The statement by Mr. Isakadze, who holds a high government post in Georgia, was received with bewilderment in Moscow. Over the past few years, the Russian leaders have been making vigorous and consistent efforts to help Tbilisi and Sukhumi reach an agreement with one another and to find a mutually acceptable formula for reconciliation. In this connection, we cannot help recalling that, pursuant to a decision by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian Federation, and no one else, sent peacekeepers to the conflict zone. At times these peacekeepers lay down their lives in order to prevent new outbreaks of violence between the sides. The fact that the conflict between Tbilisi and Sukhumi has not yet been settled is evidence that the sides themselves have by no means done everything to restore lost confidence and convince each other of the desirability and possibility of living in one common home.

Moscow flatly rejects the accusations made by the high-ranking Georgian representative as groundless and detrimental to Russian-Georgian relations.

United Nations S/2000/743

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 July 2000
English
Original: English, French and Russian

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1287 (2000) of 31 January 2000, and the statement of its President of 11 May 2000 (S/PRST/2000/16), as well as resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 21 July 2000 (S/2000/697),

Recalling the conclusions of the Lisbon (S/1997/57, annex) and Istanbul summits of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) regarding the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,

Stressing that the lack of progress on key issues of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, is unacceptable,

Recalling that, according to its statute, the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides should meet every two months, and *welcoming*, in this regard, the resumption of its work,

Welcoming the results of the tenth session of the Coordinating Council in Sukhumi on 11 July 2000, in particular the signing by the two sides, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Commander of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS peacekeeping force) of the protocol related to the stabilization of the situation in the security zone, and the decision that the two sides would accelerate work on the draft protocol on the return of refugees to the Gali region and measures for economic rehabilitation and on the draft agreement on peace and guarantees for the prevention for the non-resumption of hostilities,

Deeply concerned that, although currently relatively calm, the general situation in the conflict zone remains unstable,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Welcoming the important contributions that the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the CIS peacekeeping force continue to make in stabilizing the situation in the zone of conflict, *noting* that the working relationship between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force has been excellent at all levels, *stressing* the importance of continuing and increasing close cooperation and

00-55813 (E) 280700

coordination between them in the performance of their respective mandates, and *welcoming also* the decision on the extension of the stay of the CIS peacekeeping force in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, Georgia, adopted by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 21 June 2000 (S/2000/629),

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General of 21 July 2000;

2. *Strongly supports* the sustained efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, with the assistance of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator as well as of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and of the OSCE, to promote the stabilization of the situation and the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement, which includes a settlement on the political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia;

3. *Strongly supports*, also, the efforts of the Special Representative on the question of the distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, and, in particular, his intention to submit, in the near future, proposals to the parties as a basis for meaningful negotiations on that issue;

4. *Underlines* the responsibility of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations on the key outstanding issues in the United Nations-led peace process, including on the distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as part of a comprehensive settlement;

5. *Welcomes* the commitment of the parties not to use force for the resolution of any disputed questions, which must be addressed through negotiations and by peaceful means only, and to refrain from propaganda aimed at the solution of the conflict by force;

6. *Calls* on the parties to the conflict, also, to implement earlier agreed confidence-building measures and develop further measures on the basis of the relevant document signed in Sukhumi on 11 July 2000, and *recalls*, in this context, the invitation of the Government of Ukraine to host, in Yalta, a third meeting aimed at building confidence, improving security and developing cooperation between the parties;

7. *Reaffirms* the unacceptability of the demographic changes resulting from the conflict and the imprescriptible right of all refugees and displaced persons affected by the conflict to return to their homes in secure and dignified conditions, in accordance with international law and as set out in the Quadripartite Agreement of 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, annex II), and *calls upon* the parties to address this issue urgently by agreeing and implementing effective measures to guarantee the security of those who exercise their unconditional right to return, including those who have already returned;

8. *Urges* the parties, in this context, to address urgently and in a concerted manner, as a first step, the undefined and insecure status of spontaneous returnees to the Gali district, including through the re-establishment of functioning local administrative structures in which the returnee population is appropriately represented;

9. *Welcomes* steps taken by the Government of Georgia, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Bank, aiming at ensuring that the internally displaced persons enjoy their right to be

treated in the same manner as all Georgian citizens with full respect, in principle and in practice, for their imprescriptible right to return to their homes in secure and dignified conditions;

10. *Deplores* all violent incidents, as well as the development of criminal activities, in the conflict zone, and *calls on* the two sides to take urgent measures to cooperate with each other in the fight against crime of all sorts and in improving the work of their respective law enforcement organs;

11. *Demands* that both sides observe strictly the Moscow Agreement of 14 May 1994 on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces (S/1994/583, annex I);

12. *Welcomes* UNOMIG keeping its security arrangements under constant review in order to ensure the highest possible level of security for its staff;

13. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 31 January 2001, subject to a review by the Council of the mandate of UNOMIG in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate or in the presence of the CIS peacekeeping force, and *expresses* its intention to conduct a thorough review of the operation at the end of its current mandate, in the light of steps taken by the parties to achieve a comprehensive settlement;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Council regularly informed and to report three months from the date of the adoption of this resolution on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia;

15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2000/744

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 July 2000

Original: English

Letter dated 27 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have been instructed by my Government to bring to your attention the security situation in the ground safety zone (GSZ) extending 5 kilometres beyond the administrative border of Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, into the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which is seriously threatened by persistent attacks on civilians and police alike by Albanian terrorists, infiltrating from Kosovo and Metohija and often even from the Republic of Albania, especially in the areas of the municipalities of Bujanovac, Presevo, Medvedja and Kursumlija. These attacks have intensified this year, in June and July in particular.

A total of 164 terrorist attacks were committed in GSZ in the period between 10 June 1999 and 18 July 2000, 105 of them armed attacks on civilians and police, 30 armed provocations and 29 raids aimed at plunder or intimidation. Twelve persons (7 civilians and 5 policemen) were killed, while 27 persons (23 policemen, 2 civilians and 2 members of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)), were wounded.

The breakdown for this year is particularly worrisome: 118 terrorist attacks, 88 of them armed attacks on civilians and police, 17 armed provocations and 13 raids. Eight persons (6 civilians and 2 policemen) were killed, 17 persons (15 policemen and 2 civilians) were wounded and 2 persons were abducted and their fate is still unknown. Twenty-seven armed attacks and 5 armed provocations were committed in June and July alone, primarily against police and police facilities, in which 10 policemen and ! civilian were wounded and 2 civilians abducted.

Heavy weapons are used ever more frequently and more and more ruthlessly. Five policemen were injured and a police vehicle was destroyed in the explosion of an anti-tank mine in the village of Konculj on 8 June. Two other mines were found and defused near the site of the explosion. Ninety-two 82-mm grenades were fired in attacks on local police in the villages of Dobrosin, Konculj, Rudnik and Lucane on 17 and 18 July in which one policeman was seriously and three lightly wounded. A number of police vehicles and facilities were damaged. On 21 July, two explosive devices were planted in each of the buildings of the Bujanovac Town Hall and the Municipal Court in Presevo. One policeman was wounded in the explosions and extensive material damage was caused; yet, considering the institutions in which the devices had been planted, it is evident that the intention was to cause massive

00-55921 (E) 280700

casualties. Explosive devices were also found and defused in a part in Presevo on the same day.

The largest number of attacks was committed by terrorist groups which infiltrated GSZ from the area of responsibility of the United States contingent of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and Metohija. So far, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia has made 15 intercessions, 9 of them this year, with KFOR to protest these attacks. None of them seems to have helped improve the situation.

It is evident that Albanian extremists have intensified their terrorist activities and that their aim is to destabilize GSZ. By turning a blind eye, KFOR and UNMIK have become accessories to this shameful undertaking in wanton disregard of their obligations under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 and the military-technical agreement concluded between military authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 9 June 1999 (S/1999/682, enclosure). The failure of the international presences to take action has emboldened Albanian terrorists and accounted for the tragic loss of many human lives and extensive material damage, while the lack of action in their areas of responsibility is camouflaged by illegal incursions into GSZ, 120 in the past year.

The intensification of ethnic Albanian terrorism in GSZ is yet another piece of evidence that the terrorist so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has not been demilitarized and disarmed and that it is the main generator of instability in Kosovo and Metohija and outside it.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calls on the Security Council to condemn the terrorist attacks in GSZ staged by KLA and to take effective measures to put an end to these activities and prevent their spread outside Kosovo and Metohija.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vladislav **Jovanovic**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.